

Emerald Express '95: Analysis Report

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
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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) The purpose of Emerald Express was to bring together senior representatives from military, relief, political, and diplomatic communities to address issues that arise during Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations (HA/POs). In this paper, we describe the analysis resulting from Emerald Express '95 (EE95). CNA supported EE95 by providing a series of read-ahead summaries on issues such as coalition operations, mission statement development, and coordination between the military and humanitarian relief organizations. CNA also provided annotated briefings based on early findings of the HAO study team at the time of Emerald Express. This material was intended to raise issues for discussion. During the exercise itself, CNA analysts participated in and observed the working groups.				
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Summary

In this paper, we describe the analysis resulting from Emerald Express '95 (EE 95). This is provided in connection with a Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) study designed to help the Marine Corps improve its ability to conduct humanitarian assistance operations (HAOs). As part of CNA's HAO study, sponsored by I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), I MEF requested that CNA analysts support EE 95 and incorporate results from EE 95 into their study [1-10].

The purpose of Emerald Express was to bring together senior representatives from military, relief, political, and diplomatic communities to address issues that arise during humanitarian assistance and peace operations (HA/POs). Phases I and II (9-14 April 1995), which were co-sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and the Commanding General of I MEF, featured conference-style working groups. Phase I working groups focused on policy issues, whereas phase II participants looked primarily at operational issues. For phase III (22-25 May 1995), I MEF conducted a scenario-based staff exercise. I MEF published a conference report on phases I and II.

Major insights

Three major insights were derived from our EE 95 analysis:

- The military needs innovative solutions for gathering, fusing, and disseminating traditional and nontraditional types and sources of information for all phases of an operation.
- The key HAO players need to coordinate from pre-crisis to redeployment at both the policy and operations level.

- The military and policy-makers need to plan and execute operations so that rehabilitation can take place after the military leaves.

Innovative information solutions

Virtually all EE 95 participants (including the intelligence community) recognized the need for traditional and nontraditional types and sources of information for all phases of an HA/PO. Different types of information could include the culture of affected populations; the numbers, location, and medical conditions of displaced populations; and the economic, agricultural, health, and security situation of the host nation. This information affects the forces, equipment, and supplies, as well as the flow of these resources, needed for an HA/PO.

Getting this information requires using both traditional and nontraditional sources of information. Many information sources are available on potential crisis areas, particularly on the Internet. However, the intelligence community could quickly become overwhelmed with gathering, fusing, and disseminating this information. EE 95 participants at both the operations and policy levels proposed developing a Humanitarian Assistance Information Fusion Center (HAIFC) to do this job. The HAIFC would tap the Internet for potential crisis information provided on the Internet by the United Nations (UN), non-governmental organizations, private voluntary organizations/international organizations (NGOs/PVOs/IOs) and potentially many others. It would use this information to create "fused" pictures of the situation in humanitarian crisis areas for potential U.S. Government intervention. The HAIFC would disseminate unclassified elements of these pictures over the Internet for deliberate and crisis action planning (CAP). Both the military and nonmilitary could use this information.

EE 95 participants proposed forming the U.S. Interagency Information Coordination Committee (USIICC), to set priorities and identify crisis indicators for possible U.S. intervention for the HAIFC. USIICC would be an interagency policy-level group that would meet periodically to set these policies.

Coordination and crisis action planning

During EE 95, many working groups proposed organizations to facilitate coordination among all the players in HA/POs. By examining these proposed organizations, we identified the fundamental coordination steps that mirror the CAP process shown in table 1 [11]. This coordination among the key players needs to take place at the policy and operation levels.

Table 1. Coordination needed during CAP

CAP process	Coordination steps
Situation development	Pre-crisis assessment
Crisis assessment	Assessment for intervention
Course of action development	Planning coordination
Course of action selection	
Execution planning	
Execution	Ongoing crisis assessment
	Execution coordination

Planning for rehabilitation

Many Emerald Express participants accepted the concept that when the military intervenes in an HAO it is augmenting an ongoing process. The military and policy-makers should plan and execute tasks during an HA/PO so that a follow-on organization or host nation can sustain the military's accomplishments and continue moving toward host-nation self-sufficiency. If the military and the policy-makers do not plan and operate with rehabilitation in mind, the military may be asked to intervene again or the mission may appear to be a failure. Coordination among all the HAO players at all levels is key to avoid this situation.

Conclusion

Based on the combination of the HAO study-team's analysis and the EE 95 results, it is clear that HA/POs are not a lesser included case of warfighting, but are unique in many ways. This summary touches on a few of the key differences brought out in our analysis of EE 95. The main body of the report reveals more of these differences.

Introduction

In this paper, we describe the analysis resulting from Emerald Express '95 (EE 95), which is provided in connection with a Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) study designed to help the Marine Corps improve its ability to conduct humanitarian assistance operations (HAOs). As part of the CNA HAO project sponsored by the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), I MEF requested that CNA analysts support EE 95 and incorporate results from EE 95 into their study [1-10].

CNA supported Emerald Express '95 by providing a series of read-ahead summaries on issues such as coalition operations, mission statement development, and coordination between the military and humanitarian relief organizations. CNA also provided annotated briefings based on early findings of the HAO study team at the time of Emerald Express. This material was intended to raise issues for discussion. During the exercise itself, CNA analysts participated in and observed the working groups. These analysts included HAO study-team members as well as others with appropriate backgrounds. This paper presents our analysis of the recommendations and discussion that took place during EE 95.

Emerald Express background

I MEF has responsibilities as U.S. Central Command's prospective Joint Task Force (JTF) for humanitarian assistance and peace operations (HA/POs). To address these responsibilities I MEF conducts an annual Emerald Express exercise to maintain its proficiency and readiness in HA/POs.

This year's Emerald Express was a three-phase event. Phases I and II, which were co-sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and the Commanding General of I MEF,

featured conference-style working groups. For phase III, I MEF conducted a scenario-based staff exercise.

Phase I

Phase I (9–11 April 1995) brought together senior representatives from the military, relief, political, and diplomatic communities in order to address important policy- and strategy-level issues that commonly arise during HA/POs. The goal was not so much to uncover new issues as to identify and record recommendations related to HA/POs derived from the participants' past experience. The topics for the phase I working groups were as follows:

- Preparing military forces for future humanitarian crises
- Conducting coordinated mission planning
- Coordinating military and relief actions with political and diplomatic initiatives
- Collecting and sharing crisis-relevant information
- Delivering urgently needed medical and relief supplies
- Curbing human-rights abuses and rebuilding civil institutions
- Identifying the relationship between humanitarian crises and national interests.

Phase II

Phase II (11–14 April 1995) focused more on operational and tactical issues. In particular, the Commanding General of I MEF wanted participants to consider the implications of the phase I policy recommendations on operations. The topics for the phase II working groups were as follows:

- Interagency planning and coordination
- Mission planning
- Mission operations
- Humanitarian operations

- Coalition operations
- Military tactics and techniques
- Force preparation and training
- Mine clearing, disarming, demobilization, and training of civilians
- Logistics
- Health issues
- Legal aspects
- Media
- JTF operations
- Information dissemination
- Information gathering and sharing.

A conference report describing phases I and II was published by I MEF and the State Department [11]. Specific working group recommendations, notes, and briefing slides are cataloged in [12]. A summary of recommendations from each working group is taken from [11] and presented in appendix A.

Phase III

For phase III (22–25 May), I MEF conducted a scenario-based staff-exercise to provide professional military education (PME) for the staffs of I MEF and its major subordinate commands: 1st Marine Division, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, and 1st Force Service Support Group. During phase III, participants addressed many of the same issues from phases I and II and their implications at the JTF-level. Topics included:

- Planning humanitarian assistance operations
- Considering operational and tactical matters in HAOs
- Forming coalitions

- Assisting military and relief organization interaction in HA/POs
- Developing and managing an information strategy
- Providing military support to civilian authorities (MSCA).

This last item on providing *military support to civilian authorities* was briefed to the participants on the final day, but wasn't part of the actual exercise. CNA's own analysis on this subject is presented in [5].

To address the first five issues, a scenario was developed to provide the context for JTF-level evaluation of the issues and earlier conference results and recommendations. The seminar participants were separated into four groups to act as mock JTFs. The MEF staff and each major service-component staff formed the core for a JTF staff. After initial briefings on a subject area, each of the four JTFs met to develop approaches to the issues. They focused on approaches to the issues rather than a plan for responding to the specific scenario. All JTFs then briefed their approaches individually in a plenary session.

Road map

In this paper, we discuss first three major insights from our analysis of EE 95:

- Information solutions
- Coordination stress points
- Planning for rehabilitation.

These insights concern information gathering, fusing, and dissemination; operational-level coordination between relief organizations (or the host nation) and the military during an operation; and planning for rehabilitation. Second, we discuss issues such as the information campaign, military medicine in HA/POs, and logistics and engineering in the context of the phases of an operation: pre-crisis, military intervention (including mission planning, deployment, execution, transition, and redeployment), and reconstruction/rehabilitation.

Major HA/PO insights

Three major insights emerged from our analysis of the three phases of Emerald Express '95. These insights concerned innovative information solutions, coordination throughout an operation, and planning for rehabilitation. The following sections will discuss each of these major issues.

Information solutions

In HA/POs, as in warfighting operations, information must be collected, fused, analyzed and shared to support initial and ongoing assessments, and to estimate supportability requirements. However, we discovered through the CNA study that additional valuable and important sources and types of information for HA/POs are needed.

Many important sources of information for HAOs exist that the military is unaccustomed to using. Also, the information itself that must be gathered in these operations is different from what the military is used to collecting. Finally, in some cases, information may be so abundant that it is necessary to create new organizations to help assemble it into a clear picture that can be disseminated to JTF staffs, CINC staffs, policy groups, and others who might become involved in an operation.

Emerald Express participants, including intelligence-community representatives (CIA, DIA, and the military) recognized the need for different types of information to support HA/POs identified by the HAO study. The intelligence community representatives agreed that they should become the "information" community and tap nontraditional sources, particularly open-source materials. Several working groups discussed this issue.

Depending on the operation, different information needs might include the culture of the host-nation population; the numbers,

locations, and medical conditions of displaced populations; the infrastructure situation that can affect operations; host-nation laws; status-of-forces agreements with the host nation; and the security, economic, agricultural, security, and health situation of the host nation. All of this information, both traditional and nontraditional, will affect the forces, equipment, and supplies, and the flow of these resources necessary to conduct the HA/PO (planning).


For example, during Operation Guantanamo (GTMO), the migrant population (Haitians) preferred to prepare their own food. Also, Haitians were reluctant to use the laundry facilities provided because, within the context of the Haitian culture, laundry and washing practices serve as a social function that the Haitians preferred to conduct by themselves. Understanding culture, in this example, could lead to a lesser need for military personnel to provide and maintain cooking and laundry equipment. In addition to helping determine requirements more appropriately, accommodating cultural sensitivities can improve the morale of the assisted populations.

Getting this information can require tapping sources different from those the military typically uses. During Emerald Express, the information working groups suggested a number of information sources, including NGOs/PVOs/IOs, the UN, other neighboring countries, the U.S. ambassador in the host nation, and U.S. citizens or residents from the host nation. Because many sources of information exist, these sources could provide redundant, perhaps partial, or even conflicting information. Therefore, the information needs to be fused into a single picture. This picture should then be disseminated to potential JTF and CINC staffs, and other military and non-military communities that may be interested.

Emerald Express participants expressed the need for ongoing situation assessment to identify high-probability crisis areas for pre-crisis planning, mission planning, and operation execution. They developed a concept to address all the needs identified in the HAO study, i.e., nontraditional and traditional information sources and types of information, a fused picture of the situation, and the need to have ongoing assessments of potential crisis areas.

Figure 1 illustrates the concept discussed at EE 95 and further developed by the HAO study. Participants proposed the development of a Humanitarian Assistance Information Fusion Center (HAIFC). The HAIFC would be responsible for gathering all the information through the Internet and through traditional military-intelligence sources, fusing that information into an analyzed picture, and disseminating the fused picture over the Internet. The many players in an HAO would then have the information necessary to better plan and conduct an HAO.

Figure 1. Humanitarian Assistance Information Fusion Center alternative



The HAIFC would be a Washington-based standing body responsible for keeping an up-to-date fused picture, with all the necessary information components, for a variety of potential crisis regions around the world. This picture would be monitored for potential crisis

indicators. If the military is asked to intervene, the HAIFC would support crisis action planning. It would also support deliberate planning for potential areas for military intervention. EE 96 participants named HAIFC representatives as the Department of Defense (DOD), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), State Department, and other U.S. Government agencies. EE 95 participants in the information working group proposed that DIA lead the HAIFC. (DIA was the lead for the working group.) However, DIA may limit the types of participants on the HAIFC because of their security requirements. Perhaps the State Department would be the appropriate lead for the HAIFC. In addition, we think that PVOs/IOs also should be represented because they can contribute by helping sort through biased data, interpret the data, and provide insight on the types of data that should be collected and analyzed.

To determine what areas the HAIFC should monitor and what crisis indicators it should look for, EE 95 participants suggested that a policy-level mechanism be established to address these policy issues. They called this the U.S. Interagency Information Coordination Center (USIICC) (see figure 1). As proposed at EE 95, USIICC would be a high-level group from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); DOD; Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); Commerce/National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration; Defense Mapping Agency; U.S. Information Agency; and U.S.-based private volunteer organizations. The lead agent would be the State Department at the assistant secretary level, and the executive agent for the Intelligence community would be the DIA. The USIICC would meet periodically to set policy for the HAIFC and to determine a prioritized list of crisis areas for potential intervention based on the HAIFC fused picture of the situation. Although the Marines and the military would not form the USIICC, they could make the State Department aware of the need for this organization through their chain of command or this analysis.

Because the HAIFC will be monitored by a policy-level group, it may be inclined to collect overarching humanitarian information, such as starvation rate, to help decision-makers determine if there should be military intervention. This information would be useful to the

operational community, but it would not help with the operational needs for planning, such as airport and seaport accessibility, road conditions, existing infrastructure, and the culture of the people.

The military, through the DOD representative on the HAIFC, would need to interact with the HAIFC, to let it know the kinds of information necessary to begin pre-crisis and mission planning. Pre-crisis planning would be based on USIICC's crisis area priority list.

EE 95 participants also thought that the United Nations (UN) could develop an organization similar to the USIICC, which could be called the UN International Information Coordination Center (UNIICC). The UNIICC would be parallel to the USIICC previously described. Representation suggested at EE 95 would include the State Department, other governments, and NGO groups such as InterAction. Who would be the leader of the UNIICC was not discussed at EE 95. The functions of this committee would be similar to those for the U.S.-based committee; it would develop policy and assign priorities to crisis areas for display on its Internet Web page.

Coordination and crisis action planning

During Emerald Express phases I and II, each of the working groups recommended establishment of new coordination organizations. In each case, these groups were envisioned to facilitate coordination between the military and other key organizations and agencies involved in a decision or activity, both at the policy and operational levels. The organizations' participants ranged from the National Command Authority to in-country NGOs. We will discuss the specific organizations later in the paper. Here we want to focus on the implications of the EE 95 organization proposals as a whole.

Figure 2 shows the type of activities represented by the different coordination organizations proposed during EE 95. The functions shown in the figure represent about 18 organizations proposed at EE 95. These functions represent the coordination steps needed during HAOs as identified by the proposed coordination organizations. They mirror the CAP process, but have additional players and a different focus at each step. Figure 3 shows this parallel process. Clearly,


the Emerald Express participants identified the need for better coordination at every phase of an operation and at every level.

Figure 2. Coordination functions identified by proposed organizations at EE 95



This parallel process shows that humanitarian operations require the same steps as any crisis, yet the phases of CAP must be conducted through interagency committees rather than just at the unified Commander in Chief (CINC) or JTF level. The following paragraphs will explain the steps of the coordination process in parallel with the CAP process.

Figure 3. Emerald Express coordination stress points and crisis action planning



We have already discussed alternative solutions to coordination with U.S. Government agencies, in-theatre relief organizations, or the host nation for situation development and crisis assessment. The HAIFC

would gather and fuse traditional and nontraditional types of information from all appropriate sources. The USIICC would oversee the HAIFC at the policy level.

The interagency planning and coordination team at EE 95 also identified a need for a coordinated final assessment to determine whether there should be military intervention. The team suggested forming an interagency assessment team (IAT) that would consist of various U.S. Government agencies (including the DOD) likely to be involved in an intervention: NGOs/PVOs/IOs and the UN would also be part of the team to ensure that all relevant perspectives would be included in the assessment. The IAT would be led jointly by the National Security Council (NSC) and the State Department. The purpose of the IAT assessment would be to ensure a common ground of exposure to conditions in the affected region for the IAT participants.


The IAT would not necessarily be a standing organization, but would be developed when a final assessment is needed to determine if U.S. intervention is necessary. The resulting *single* report would be given to a Standing Interagency Team on humanitarian emergencies, a high-level group with wide representation, chaired by someone on the NSC. As a result of the IAT assessment, this team would have a common understanding of the conditions, which would enable it to make more-informed recommendations about intervention. The operational community could also use this assessment for planning purposes. The IAT should include members from the USIICC and/or HAIFC because they also need a picture of the situation. This point was not discussed at EE 95.

During the course of action development and selection, and execution planning, EE 95 participants discussed the need to include non-military players, such as NGOs, the host nation, and the UN, in the planning. At the operational level, this means including these other players in the Operational Planning Team (OPT). The military supports these organizations in HA/POs, and efforts should be made to complement its support and to ensure that the military operations can be sustained by these organizations, which often remain to continue what the military started. This is discussed in more detail in the next section.

The EE 95 working groups also suggested creating an interagency organization for policy coordination called the Washington Coordination Group (WCG). Its primary function would be to provide head-quarter-level coordination during military planning and execution, and to support coordinated policy development and interpretation. Its membership would consist of high-level representatives from DOD, NSC, PVOs, USAID, USLNOs, the State Department, and others as appropriate. The State Department was proposed as the lead organization.

The Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) was initially proposed in past operations and again during Emerald Express to address coordination during the *execution* phase of an operation at the operational level. CMOC functions included civil-military policy issues, prioritizing health, logistics, security, infrastructure, humanitarian needs, and information exchange. However, EE 95 participants noted the number and type of responsibilities being directed toward the CMOC, which led to the identification of several proposed organizations to address civil-military operations. The ESG and WCG were proposed to handle the policy-level questions that in the past have been brought to the CMOC for lack of another coordination mechanism between the military and those it is supporting. Some working groups also thought that the military may not be the best organization to set priorities for the humanitarian needs of the local population. Independently, some EE 95 working groups proposed *focus-of-effort teams* to address military support for humanitarian assistance. The HAO study further developed this concept to link these teams to the CMOC. Figure 4 illustrates this concept.

Figure 4. Emerald Express CMOC concept



The medical working group felt that the military should not be setting overall policy in the health field. Typically, the military will control all ports and airfields. Therefore, UN relief organizations, NGOs/PVOs/IOs, and other organizations that need to deliver medical or support supplies (not necessarily by the military) must submit their requests for port access or for supplies to the CMOC. This puts the military in the position of determining the medical and public-health needs and setting priorities for international humanitarian assistance. Instead, the medical working group thought that the Health Committee already in the country should be recognized, or if there is no Health Committee, one should be formed to set priorities for the population's health needs. This group would be led by the UN health coordinator or, if the UN is not involved, the host-nation's health governing body, or the largest health-relief organization. This committee would set the overall policy and formulate a proposed set of priorities to meet the humanitarian needs of the population. It would then submit the priorities to the CMOC, which would then coordinate other requests and balance the operational reality with these priorities.

EE 95 participants in the logistics working group thought that the military should consider forming a Civil-Military Logistics Center (CMLC), either within a joint logistic support command (JLSC) or the CMOC, to provide a direct interface between relief organizations and the military on logistics-related matters. If there are considerable civilian logistics requirements, perhaps the CMLC should be part of the CMOC, rather than the JLSC, to take some of the non-military logistics burden off the CMOC and allow the CMLC to be more easily transitioned to the follow-on organization. In addition, logistics requirements would frequently need to be coordinated with other requests for military support (such as security). In this case, separating the CMLC from the CMOC would not be feasible. The CMLC could submit the logistics requests to the CMOC for coordination of other requested support.

The JTF working group thought that a joint targeting board (JTB), should be a part of the CMOC. This organization would propose a prioritized list of humanitarian and non-humanitarian targets for Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF)/CCTF consideration. Given

the discussion during Emerald Express about the enormous number of functions in CMOC, and some of the other proposed subgroups to CMOC, perhaps the JTB should focus on security issues to submit to the CMOC.


Planning for rehabilitation

For HAOs, the military and political communities need to consider what will happen to an area after the military departs; for example, if intervention is triggered by conditions of starvation, will these same conditions resurface 6 months or a year after the military leaves? Such an occurrence could either cause the military to intervene again or else the previous mission might be seen as a failure.

The military is asked to provide support for HA/POs. There may be a relief network or a functioning government in place before the military operation. The military is called in as a last resort when the situation becomes too difficult for the in-place relief network or government to handle. It is typically a supporting element of an HA/PO operation, not the centerpiece. In a way, the military is augmenting an ongoing process when they go in, and they need to plan and conduct operations to support, supplement, and complement that process so that the follow-on organization or host-nation government can sustain the accomplishments of the military. Conducting operations that can be sustained and those that will set up follow-on rehabilitation can lead to successful transition. This implies the need for an incremental transition of functions/responsibilities to a follow-on organization (such as the UN) or the host nation. In addition, careful planning is needed if crisis intervention actions are to help set the conditions to allow longer-term rehabilitation efforts to take place or to prevent the crisis from recurring. Figure 5 is an example of this concept.

EE 95 showed that (1) recovery and stability are in the interest of the military and policy-makers, and (2) the way that the military performs its mission can greatly affect the chances for longer-term recovery in an area. This second point also illustrates why it is so important that the military coordinate its efforts with experts in relief and development. Although the military and policy-makers may have good intentions, they can inadvertently set back relief efforts because they do not have a long-term view of the situation and do not plan and conduct operations (or set policy) so that the transition can be successful.

Figure 5. Comparison of traditional and HA/PO timelines



For example, in Somalia the military was providing fresh water to the population using reverse-osmosis-water purification units (ROWPUs). The military knew that it would eventually have to take the ROWPUs when it withdrew from Somalia, so it drilled wells to provide water to the population. However, some time after the military left, the pumps used in the wells broke. No one knew how to maintain the pumps to get water. In this case, the military thought a little about the situation beyond its departure, i.e., it drilled wells to provide water. However, it did not train relief organizations or the local population to repair and maintain the pumps in the wells.

The need to consider sustainability of accomplishments was accepted by many of the military officers during the Emerald Express '95 conference. Including relief organizations and the host-nation representatives in the planning process to facilitate planning for rehabilitation was discussed as one solution to this problem.

Key issues of HA/POs by phases of an operation

Emerald Express participants also discussed other HA/PO issues. These issues can be separated by the phases of an operation: pre-crisis and crisis intervention, including mission planning, deployment, operations transition, and redeployment. We have already discussed planning for rehabilitation in the section on major insights. Many of these issues are linked to the insights in the previous section.

Pre-crisis

When the military is not intervening in an operation, it can do several things to improve its ability to conduct HA/POs. The need to have ongoing information on potential crisis areas is crucial. In addition, the military can take certain actions before HA/PO intervention is imminent to improve its ability to conduct an information campaign. Also to be dealt with during the pre-crisis phase are the policy and operational issues that concern the capabilities of military forces versus the requirements to conduct HA/POs.

Policy and operations links

EE 95 participants saw disconnects between policy decisions and operations on the ground in a number of ways. Two ways that can be examined before military intervention are (1) forming a coalition, and (2) understanding the capabilities of the military versus the requirements to conduct an operation.

Military capabilities

During Emerald Express, some participants felt that policy-makers who are deciding when the military should intervene should focus on HA/PO requirements that only the military can address. Also, military capabilities should be coordinated to support other organizations (the relief community, the host nation, or other agencies) to

multiply the effects of the relief effort. However, the military must realize that although other organizations may be able to fulfill the requirements needed in the host nation, the U.S. military may be the organization of choice in a crisis. Before a crisis, the operational community should *convey its capabilities to the policy-makers*, who can then assign the tasks that the military can fulfill during an intervention.

Coalition formation

Coalitions are formed because (1) other countries can share the burden of addressing the needs of a crisis area; (2) a coalition implies international legitimacy; and (3) when countries come together to help solve agreed-upon problems, this builds goodwill and understanding that could lead to a more peaceful world. Many people see only this positive side of forming coalitions.

However, coalition partners may become involved in an operation for reasons other than those listed above. For example:

- The motivation to do good. It is a part of the foreign policy of some nations, e.g., Canada and parts of Scandinavia, is to conduct humanitarian missions.
- To gain world status and prestige. Some small nations seek international credibility through their involvement in international affairs.
- To improve morale. Conducting HA/POs gives the military forces of some countries a reason for existing, for example, Ukraine after the Soviet Union's collapse.
- To sustain the military forces. The UN pays countries about \$1,000 per month per soldier. For many countries, this sum can support their entire military forces.
- To side with the United States. When the United States leads the military component of an HA/PO, some countries believe that, by their support for the operation, the United States may back them when they need military help.

In past operations, foreign militaries that volunteered forces, money, and equipment were rarely (if ever) turned down by the State

Department. For particularly poor countries, U.S. forces would have to support these foreign militaries by providing anything from shoes, to guns, to food, to equipment maintenance, and so forth. In some cases, coalition partners were promised maintenance support and spare parts that the U.S. military could not provide. This has occasionally led the U.S. military to seek outside contract support for allies, paid for by the United States. Consequently, in many cases, instead of these coalition forces sharing the burden of the operations, they have added to it.

Because of these factors, the Emerald Express participants expressed a need for policy-makers to develop coalition formation policy before intervention that reflects a balance between operational and political objectives. To implement this policy, the operational community should clearly convey to policy-makers through its chain of command, the military capabilities required to conduct a particular HA/PO. The military should assess the capabilities needed for the HA/PO. Also, policy-makers should improve their ability to coordinate and communicate with JCS and the Pentagon down the chain of command in the decision process. Policy-makers can then make an informed decision about including particular coalition partners.

Operations preparation

EE 95 participants discussed three major areas where the military could prepare for HA/POs before a crisis. These areas are the information campaign, logistics, and military medicine. We also present additional ways to train and educate the military at a tactical level that were discussed at EE 95.

Information campaign

The information campaign for an HA/PO plays an important lead role in the success of the HA/PO. Intelligence, psychological operations (PSYOP), and the media contribute to the information campaign. EE 95 participants in the information-dissemination working group noted some broad objectives for PSYOP in an HA/PO:

- Provide requested security of the relief force
- Minimize casualties

- Facilitate relief operations
- Promote public health and hygiene
- Increase cooperation.

To achieve these objectives, information plays a key role in keeping the civilian populace informed. This can be as simple as providing the time and location of food distribution. It can also inform and prepare the population for the entry of a military force and inform them of the goals, activities, and progress of an operation. The objective of providing understanding is to decrease possible interference with the crisis intervention and help the local population understand and support the U.S. (or coalition) operation.

However, many stumbling blocks to having a successful information campaign during an HA/PO were identified during EE 95. First, the current name in the military for an information campaign is a PSYOP campaign. To those outside the military, the perception is that the military is trying to manipulate thinking and propagandize. But the true nature of a PSYOP campaign in HA/POs is to provide an informational tool that can help in every phase of an operation. A more appropriate name might be "military information programs."

Second, little doctrine exists on developing and executing an information campaign during HA/POs. Developing doctrine would improve training and execution for conducting an information campaign during an HA/PO.

Third, easier access to PSYOP personnel is needed. The few Marine PSYOP personnel are in the Reserves (part of the Civil Affairs Groups), and the Army has only one active brigade. To address this problem, the Marines need a way to more readily access their Reserve units or to have easier access to active Army PSYOP personnel.

The above paragraphs highlight problems that the military can solve internally. Some problems can also be addressed externally to improve the conduct of an information campaign during an HA/PO.

The media play an important role in the information campaign. They tell the story to the general public in the United States, the host nation, and in other countries. The image of the military often depends on the media's perceptions of their mission. The military must also work with NGOs/PVOs/IOs during an HA/PO. These groups should understand the capabilities of the military. In the pre-crisis phase, the military can convey information about its capabilities to address HA/PO problems to the relief community, the media, and other agencies. Also, the military can provide liaison officers to major NGOs before a crisis, and the NGOs can do the same, to gain perspective on each other's viewpoints.

Logistics

Military equipment inventories and deployment packages are not ordinarily designed for HAOs. Participants at Emerald Express discussed this and had the following recommendations, each of which requires further study. Their advice to the military included:

- Develop an acquisition strategy to reflect participation in HAOs as well as in combat, perhaps by purchasing dual-use equipment
- Develop force packages to address HAO needs
- Reconfigure supplies aboard Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) for HAOs. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) currently stockpiles plastic sheeting worldwide because it is useful in humanitarian emergencies. Perhaps the military can take similar steps.

It would also be worthwhile to review the distribution of Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) to ensure that billets that are in high demand for HAOs are adequately represented. Military police, Civil Affairs, and PSYOP billets are a few examples.

Medical

Given the comparative advantages of those involved in an HA/PO, the *medical* working group at Emerald Express felt that the relief community or the host-nation, not the military, should be in charge of the host-nation population's health needs. And any efforts by military

medicine to provide either direct clinical care or public health services to the local population should be coordinated with the ongoing efforts of the host nation and the relief community.

The primary role of military medicine is to support the troops. Given this mission, they are well equipped to provide trauma care to an otherwise healthy, and predominantly young, male population. Although expertise in trauma care may be beneficial under some HA/PO scenarios (such as earthquake relief), typically the military will not be on the scene fast enough to treat these victims. In addition, military medicine often lacks the critical resources necessary to meet the health needs of the local population. On the other hand, the military does have access to resources that could greatly contribute to a public health campaign (such as preventive medicine labs, vaccines, and ROWPUs).

In some cases (such as medical emergencies of a limited duration), the military may be asked to provide direct clinical care to the local population. In this case, medical supplies should be supplemented with rehydration salts and pediatric medicines, and the mix of physicians should include specialists, such as general practitioners, pediatricians, obstetricians/gynecologists, and others who can address the specific needs of the indigenous population.

At EE 95, the participants in the medical working group were limited to preventive medicine officers and NGOs/PVOs. The civic role of military medicine was not explored and should be explored further.

Conduct HAO-related training and education¹

Improve military education regarding HAOs. Participants at Emerald Express discussed ways of improving military education regarding HAOs. Suggestions included increasing emphasis on HAO case-studies at war colleges, and conducting HAO war games and staff exercises. Periodically, guest speakers with experience in HAOs could give lectures at different commands. Lecturers could be from the military, the OFDA, NGOs/PVOs, the UN, or other nations.

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1. For an in-depth look at the training and education required to conduct HAOs see [2].

A few active-duty officers could receive limited, specialized education by attending OFDA training, or relief conferences. It might also be worthwhile to assign certain reservists the task of becoming HAO-experts through reading papers, attending conferences, and making personal contacts with outside organizations who work in this area.

Exercise HAO-related troop skills. The working groups identified several skills that troops may need in order to conduct HAOs, such as crowd-control and riot-control methods. Because HAOs can occur in cities, training in military operations in built-up (urban) areas can be important. Training for HAOs should also include situational drills and vignette-style training that stress decision-making and interacting with civilians.

Increase NGO-military familiarity. Participants at Emerald Express saw a need to educate the relief community regarding the military. Although some relief workers have prior military experience, others cannot tell a corporal from a colonel. NGOs/PVOs need to understand the capabilities of the military and how the military operates. Mutual understanding between the military and the relief-community could be improved by including relief-organization representatives in military planning and HAO staff exercises. This would have the added benefit of making the exercises more realistic. Also, sending military representatives to professional relief conferences would increase their exposure to the relief community and vice versa.

Crisis intervention

Crisis intervention includes mission planning, deployment, operations, transition, and redeployment. The following sections discuss issues brought up during EE 95 within each of these stages of crisis intervention.

Mission planning

During EE 95, several issues were discussed that pertain to mission planning. These discussions included development of a political-military plan; information gathering, fusion, and dissemination; coordination among the political, military, and

humanitarian actors at the policy and operational levels for mission planning; and development of an information strategy/campaign plan. Training and education at a tactical level was also discussed. The need for information gathering, fusion, and dissemination in order to conduct mission planning, as well as ways to facilitate coordination were discussed in the insights section of the paper and will not be repeated here. The following sections concern the remaining mission-planning issues.

Develop a political-military plan

EE 95 participants recommended that the political and military communities develop a political-military plan (some thought that this should be a political-military-humanitarian plan) during mission planning. The purpose of such a plan would be to open discussion between the military and other government agencies. For the Haiti operation, the military opened their plan to government agencies. It did generate discussion, but according to those involved in the planning process who were present at EE 95, no one signed it because the plan was dynamic and agencies did not want to be accountable for promises made. During Emerald Express, participants recommended that the Haiti political-military plan be used as a template for future operations.

The mission-planning working group discussed attempting to synchronize military timelines with those of other key actors in the political-military plan. In many cases, the political, humanitarian, and military timelines are not synchronized, and each community is unaware of the others' timelines.

Many policy-makers do not understand how long it takes for the military to deploy. Because the military is self-sustaining, its timeline is longer than just the time it takes to reach the scene. It must bring food, shelter, water, equipment, and other items for the entire deploying force to last for a certain number of days. For example, the Commanding General (CG) of I MEF testified before Congress when the Senate was considering military intervention in Rwanda. The CG was asked how long it would take to deploy to Rwanda. His time estimate was far longer than the Senators anticipated. From EE 95, the need

for a political-military plan to synchronize the operational and policy timelines should be seriously considered.

Coalition formation should also be included in the political-military plan. The United States frequently must train coalition forces, equip them, maintain their assets, and provide transportation. We discussed considerations for coalition formation in detail in the pre-crisis section.

Develop an information strategy and campaign plan

During EE 95, CG I MEF asserted that, "As important as the bullets, as important as the sticky foam, is the information." We have already discussed the need for using different sources and types of information in the pre-crisis section. This information can be used to develop an information strategy that can be defined as the integration of information-gathering, analysis, and dissemination assets using all available civilian and military resources to support CJTF mission objectives. Three main pillars of an information strategy—and the importance of making sure that they work together to support the operation—were discussed throughout EE 95. These three pillars are as follows:

- Intelligence
- Military information (PSYOP)
- Media.

The purpose of the *intelligence* in the information strategy is to establish a central repository of information that presents a common picture of the situation. This common picture should include traditional and nontraditional types and sources of information. This need was discussed in detail in the major HA/PO insights section.

In HA/POs, PSYOP or military information should be considered a vital link to the local population. It is through the PSYOP campaign (and through interactions with the local media, discussed below) that military forces conducting an emergency intervention can communicate their intentions and inform the local people so that they will know what to expect. Not surprisingly, those who are already affected

by the stress of the crisis can facilitate the achievement and maintenance of a more stable operating environment.

Emerald Express participants stressed that a PSYOP or military information plan should be developed during mission planning, and should focus on three key elements:

- A clear, simple theme (one that is easy to remember and that can be conveyed by some of the means listed here, or by similar means)
- An identified target audience (which may not be the easiest to reach or the most obvious—e.g., the urban one closest to the C/JTF operational headquarters—but other groups that may not be visible or centrally located)
- An appropriate means of communicating (TV and video, the newspaper, leaflet drops, word of mouth, drama troupes, objects such as T-shirts or bumper stickers, or simply bringing food and medicine wherever you go).

The EE 95 participants made it clear that they saw the *media* as key to the information strategy. The media are independent and hardly monolithic; they include multiple forms—TV, direct broadcast, magazines, and newspapers—and many different markets. The world press, the DOD media pool, the coalition media, the media in the area of responsibility (AOR), and the “internal” military media all market their products to different audiences, including the world public, the coalition-partner publics, the U.S. public, the residents in the AOR, and the military. The challenge is to speak with one voice to all the players. The CJTF should consider the media to be part of the mission, even if the media do not see it that way.

Just as for PSYOP, the military should develop a consistent theme for the media before the operation begins. The theme must be as clear and acceptable as possible. Emerald Express participants recommended that it should be developed cooperatively by the intelligence, PSYOP/military information, public affairs, and coalition elements. The message should also reflect the CJTF’s intent.

Potential impediments to achieving this early cooperation include the fact that when a warning order goes out, it is supposed to identify the PAO for the mission, but it often reads "PAO:TBD" (to be determined).

Although the question of using media pools for HA/POs was initially raised as a "should we or shouldn't we as a general rule/policy" question, most participants in the media working group agreed that it was not advisable to have a set policy one way or the other; individual decisions should be made for each operation.

EE 95 participants expressed the belief that, because the reporters tell the story, the military needs to support them as they carry out their "mission." The basic requirements for media success are access (to key areas in the AOR, the troops, the commander) and filing capability. As one presenter put it, "It is an operational requirement to help them get it [their story] out, 24 hours a day."

The Emerald Express phase II media working group concluded that the media need to be "part of the TPFDD." That means planning for their billeting, transporting satellite dishes and other equipment, and including them in plans for an NEO. An elaborate example of media accommodation was the "Media City" established in Somalia for United Shield; it was the largest group (other than perhaps the military) ashore there.

One challenge for the PAO involved in planning is that, when a DOD media pool receives special treatment, the coalition media must be given the same access.

Tactical-level training and education

Before troops arrive in country they require some training and education specific to the upcoming humanitarian mission. This pre-deployment training and education should include:

- Briefings on the local political situation, culture, factions, etc. For officers, the Foreign Service Institute offers day-long and week-long orientation courses for different countries.

- Crowd-control methods and instruction in how to apply less-lethal weaponry if applicable. Examples of new less-lethal weaponry were demonstrated at the conference; however, policy still needs to be set detailing the circumstances under which this weaponry is to be applied, along with authorization procedures.
- Applying rules of engagement (ROE). This can be tricky in HAOs. Troops need practice and scenario-based drills.
- Dealing with land mines (if applicable). During the conference, EE participants spoke a lot about mine hazards.

Deployment

Three major issues that occur during the deployment phase were discussed during EE 95: (1) examining the impact of military operations on the local area; (2) launching the information campaign; and (3) non-military and coalition influence on force flow. The following sections discuss each of these issues.

Impact on local area

The largest part of a CJTF footprint during HA/POs usually consists of logistics-support elements. Reduction of this footprint can help mission accomplishment by reducing U.S. presence and reducing competition, particularly with the relief community, for scarce support resources. It also reduces stress on available infrastructure. Reducing this footprint can help resolve policy considerations related to host-nation sensitivities that focus on concerns about internal population responses to a foreign military presence on the host-nation's soil. Both the logistics and JTF working groups suggested that when resupply and support from sea-based assets is feasible, the CJTF commander should consider using those assets instead of establishing similar operations ashore.

When the military intervenes in an HA/POs, its presence and actions can affect the host-nation environment. For example, providing free food to the population can negatively affect the market economy of the host nation. In addition, the military is not the sole user of ports

and airfields. There will be competing demands for berthing spaces, port and airfield storage facilities, and material-handling equipment for offloading equipment and supplies. The military should incorporate relief organization, host nation, and coalition force requirements with organic requirements. A system should be developed whereby U.S. military, coalition military, and non-military requirements can be consolidated, prioritized, and coordinated. This system could be implemented in the Operations Planning Team (OPT).

Using military assets to treat the local population may also have detrimental long-term effects. EE 95 participants in the medical working groups felt that providing medical care to the population at U.S. standards can undermine the local health organizations and practitioners, weakening those agencies that will carry on once the military has gone. Much of the poor health conditions observed during HA/POs are the result of poverty and underdevelopment. These are pre-existing conditions that will probably continue after the military has left. The medical working group thought that the best way to combat these health crises is through long-term training, education, and preventive-medicine programs. These long-term efforts, as well as the overall health policy, should be developed and implemented by international humanitarian organizations, in conjunction with the local government (if applicable) and the local medical community. Therefore, the most appropriate planning for the use of military medical and public health assets should concentrate on providing sustainable health projects compatible with the long-term needs of the country. And the best way to accomplish this is to coordinate with humanitarian organizations.

Launching the information campaign

The information campaign is launched during deployment. EE 95 participants thought that PSYOP or military information personnel should begin operations before troops actually arrive on the ground, thus the local population will know what to expect and the possibility of opposition to the arrival of military forces will be decreased.

The mine-clearing, disarming, demobilization, and training-of-civilians working groups at EE 95 stressed the importance of openly

available, all-source, theater-specific intelligence regarding the mine threat, as well as the threat from armed members of the local population. The group recommended that the information be consolidated and disseminated from a central coordinating body, the Mine Action Center (MAC).

Because of the enormity of mine threats in crisis areas, the group also recommended establishment of a "Big MAC" at the UN, a repository for strategic information and institutional memory amassed from all of the de-mining and demobilization efforts in HA/POs. This would include information on the militaries' and private groups' de-mining experts with strong capabilities, as well as information on contractors who could take over the various efforts required to reintegrate demobilized civilians into their own society. An assessment team member deployed to the crisis area before the full deployment of the intervening forces would share information gathered with the Big MAC, which would help MAC personnel assess needs and make recommendations for action during and after the military intervention.²

The information provided to the media on the details of the deployment itself can be critical if a decision is made to inform them of when and where it will take place. The media should be given information on what, where, and how they can set up to capture the event. To ensure this, the media working group emphasized the need to plan to front-load PA assets on the deployment before most of the forces arrive, if possible, so that good decisions can be made about media presence and access.

Part of preparing the "information battlefield" is preparing the troops. They should be given clear, simple guidance on how to talk to the media. At EE 95, the general feeling was that the media should have access to the troops, particularly to tactical experts. The suggested guidance for the troops was simple rather than elaborate: as

2. One potential recommendation is that the Big MAC be part of the UNIICC organization at the UN, to avoid "institution proliferation," which would only make information more, rather than less, difficult to integrate and share.

General Shalikashvili advised, "stay in your lane." That is, talk only about what you know at your own level.

Impact of non-U.S. military on force flow

Non-military and coalition forces are likely to influence the development of time-phased force deployment database (TPFDD) elements and priorities. This is quite different from traditional military missions, where the TPFDD is normally developed solely on the basis of DOD-specified requirements and assessments.

Presently, there are no standard procedures for moving non-U.S. military resources using strategic airlift. During deployment, the military needs to incorporate relief-organization, host-nation, and coalition requirements for heavy lift into its organic lift requirements. It also needs to develop a system to consolidate, prioritize, and coordinate U.S. military, coalition military, and non-military requirements. This system must also take into account the fact that the funding for individual shipments can vary according to the situation.

Execution

During EE 95, five major issues were discussed that would affect operations:

- Ensuring that military operations can be sustained by the follow-on organization(s) or host nation after the military leaves
- Setting up and implementing the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)
- Integrating coalition forces into the CJTF
- Conducting in-theater training
- Working with the media.

The CMOC was discussed in detail in the major insights section and that discussion will not be repeated here.

Sustainability of operations

Throughout EE 95, many discussions revolved around the military supporting the existing relief or host-nation structure, rather than supplanting or replacing this structure. This was discussed in detail in the logistics and medical working groups.

Logistics

The logistics working group felt that the military should make every effort to use and to accommodate the existing logistics-support system in the host nation. This approach would ensure minimal disruption of relief activities and help to ensure that any long-term logistics efforts would be sustainable after the military forces depart.

Any infrastructure rebuilding or redevelopment effort initiated by the military must be planned so that the final capability is sustainable by the local population and the remaining relief organizations in the long term. This means that long-term reliance on military equipment should be minimized, appropriate training should be provided, and the technology required to sustain the effort is at an appropriate level for the local population. For example, instead of leaving ROWPUs to provide pure water for the population, the military should focus on drilling wells that can be maintained by the local population and/or relief organizations and provide them with maintenance training. Or the military should focus on repairing the local water system.

The logistics working group also thought that current contracting procedures for local resources could stunt efforts aimed at sustainability. These procedures often cause prices for local resources to be artificially inflated because various players in an operation may bid against each other for the same resources. NGOs/PVOs/IOs and the military may bid for the same resources, or one military service component may bid for the same resources as another military service. This competition can price the relief community out of the market, increase the cost of U.S. deployments, inhibit relief efforts, and disrupt existing logistics systems already in place (i.e., defeat sustainability). It also has long-term effects because the prices of these resources will remain high after the military leaves.

Emerald Express participants suggested a number of potential solutions to this problem. Perhaps the best solution would be to consolidate contracting. All U.S. contracting requirements should be forwarded through the CJTF J-4 before the contracting office takes action. The goal would be to expedite the contract requirements' review so that similar requirements could be consolidated and prioritized for execution. The CJTF contracting offices should also deploy with a prevailing price scheme to ensure that the government and relief community will not pay inflated rates. This can be accomplished by surveys obtained either through relief-community liaison (in the OPT or in consultation with representatives from the relief community).

Another alternative would be to form a logistics functional component to the JTF, a Joint Logistics Support Command (JLSC) if the situation indicated that significant theater-level logistics support is required. The JLSC could be the central location for submitting contracting requirements, with the same functions as the J-4 described here.

Medical

Much of the discussion in the medical working group focused on the role of military medicine in HA/POs. The working group thought that no unsustainable medical care should be provided in these operations. They felt that providing direct clinical care to the local population, such as performing medical or dental civic-action projects (MEDCAPS/DENTCAPS), is not the preferred use of military health assets. Because the primary mission of military medicine is to support the troops, it is intended for adult trauma care. Consequently, as discussed earlier, U.S. medical resources are not well suited to deal with the direct health-care needs of the local population (which tends to consist predominantly of women and children).

But even with a modified staff and the necessary equipment and medicines, providing direct clinical care to the locals may not be appropriate during humanitarian missions. The presence of U.S. physicians and facilities produces unrealistic expectations among the local population. Not only does this pose an unlimited demand on U.S. medical resources (opening the door to mission creep), it poses a difficult

moral dilemma for U.S. physicians. (Should they provide unsustainable U.S.-quality care to those in underdeveloped countries?) Most important, such care can undermine the authority of the local health organizations and practitioners. Ideally, all direct clinical care should be provided in conjunction with the local medical community. The medical working group felt that humanitarian relief organizations may be better equipped and better suited to provide care under these circumstances.

However, there may be times when direct military care is required. The working group felt that explicit policies must be in place to establish the conditions under which the military may provide medical treatment to the local population. Whenever treatment is provided, it must not exceed a level that is sustainable by the local medical community. Any exception to this rule must be detailed in the policy. One possible exception might be the treatment of someone who has been unintentionally injured by U.S. or CJTF forces.³

The working group felt that military medicine could have sustainable impact by providing medical care to the local population to control serious epidemic illness or other medical emergencies *of limited duration* (e.g., during a cholera epidemic following a natural or political crisis). And, most significantly, by contributing its rich public health resources (such as labs, cold chain for immunizations, and water purification units) to the ongoing public health campaign. These actions should be undertaken in cooperation with the relief community and the local government in support of the overall relief effort.

Not discussed in the medical working group, but nevertheless an important issue, is the fact that commanding officers may view their medical assets as a powerful tool. Providing direct first-world care to an impoverished population has an immediate and profound effect. MEDCAPS and DENTCAPS can give a commanding officer a unique opportunity to collect information or help to bring about the cooperation and goodwill of the local population. This could

3. One participant suggested that these policies be explained to the medical personnel and provided to them on cards such as the ROE cards carried by soldiers during a mission.

significantly affect the commander's ability to successfully complete the mission.

No line officers participated in the medical working group at Emerald Express, therefore the group could not examine this potential civic role of military medicine and the obvious pressure of commanding officers to employ medical resources in this manner. Is there some way to minimize the negative impact when MEDCAPS must be undertaken? Do the costs associated with "strategic" MEDCAPS outweigh the benefits to the command, or vice versa? To make the appropriate decisions as to whether to use medical resources in this way, the line officer must understand the serious negative consequences of providing unsustainable care. This area could benefit from a more thorough discussion.

The medical working group did discuss the pressure to "sell" the mission back home. The tremendous suffering that accompanies any HA/PO provides compelling images for the media to send back home. U.S. citizens want to know what we are doing to stop the suffering—MEDCAPS provide commanding officers with an easy answer. Pictures of U.S. military medical personnel delivering first-rate care to suffering children send a powerful and straightforward message to the living rooms back home. But the largest reductions in mortality and morbidity rates will come from public-health works. The U.S. military can achieve a potentially significant and sustainable impact by using its public-health assets.

The military should explore ways to publicize its public-health efforts to the press and to the American people. Commanding officers should have access to quantifiable measures of effectiveness (MOEs) of their public-health resources. In addition, repairing medical equipment, cross-training under some circumstances, and providing appropriate medical supplies are other ways in which military medical personnel can provide sustainable support to the humanitarian effort and create a positive media response.

Coalitions

The coalition working group felt that two major problems arise when forming a coalition force. First, coalition partners will listen and

follow Commander, Combined Task Force (CCTF) orders only if their own commanders agree with those orders. Command and control is preeminent in these operations, therefore a solution to this command problem must be found. Second, coalition forces have a wide range of capabilities (or lack thereof). Consequently, integrating less-capable forces with more-capable forces can cause interoperability problems. The coalition working group from phase II discussed a few ways to address these problems.

The working group suggested that major partners who bring forces, equipment, and supplies so that they can function virtually autonomously (and don't need U.S. military support) may best be assigned by the CCTF to work autonomously in a specific area with specific objectives. They would be given a specific primary objective to achieve in their assigned sector, but they would be allowed to achieve it in their own way. They would not have to follow CCTF orders directly (other than achieving the objectives assigned by the CCTF), which would eliminate some command problems. These autonomous forces could be given primary objectives to address because there would be no major command-and-control problems. Because these forces can work alone, the United States would not have to support these coalition partners.

For smaller partners who are incapable of operating autonomously, the working group felt that it would be better to integrate them with more-capable forces at the secondary and tertiary objective levels. Because of potential command-and-control problems on an integrated staff (coalition partners listening to their own commanders' orders and not following the CCTF's orders if they don't agree with their own commander's orders), the mission would not be significantly affected at the secondary and tertiary objective level.

Conducting in-theater training

To slow the loss of combat skills while on an HAO, participants at Emerald Express recommended conducting in-theater training during the mission. This has been done in past HAOs. The amount of training that the military can do in-theater is limited by several factors, including the length of the mission, the pace of the mission (if

forces are spread thin, they won't have the time or energy to train), as well as sensitivities to the image the military wants to project. If it wants to project a peaceful, nonthreatening image, it might be inappropriate to conduct highly visible combat training.

For some personnel, conducting the HAO itself provides useful training. Logistics, transportation, and support personnel perform tasks for HAOs similar to those for combat missions. HAOs also test small units and require small-unit leaders to make rapid decisions in a real-world environment. In addition, staffs can gain experience in planning and working with coalition partners.

Working with the media

During the conference, the news media were recognized as important HAO players because they can influence an operation by affecting public opinion. The news media include TV, newspapers, and radio, as well as a variety of other markets. The world press, DOD media pool, coalition media, and host-nation media all market their products to different audiences.

Speaking with one voice

In general, the media working group supported giving the CJTF the freedom to make public-affairs decisions regarding the press in theater—this media policy should follow naturally from the CJTF statement of intent. The working group also recommended that the field commander's influence on media policy extend to Washington when such policies affect the situation on the ground.

One potential difficulty that cannot be avoided entirely is the fact that decisions regarding the media made in Washington can cause problems for the commander in the field. To prevent this, Washington and the operational commander must coordinate their public-affairs efforts. For example, before Operation United Shield, Washington did not allow the CJTF to give press reports about the less-lethal weaponry that was being tested. This appearance of secrecy caused a negative reaction in Somalia when it came out in the Somali press. Finally, when Washington did release reports about the less-lethal weaponry, it gave out too many specific details (e.g., its range).

Most of the participants at EE 95 who discussed media issues thought that Washington shouldn't control the media policy and that the CJTF on the ground should use his judgment as to how to work with the media. However, in some cases this policy can have drawbacks. Some military commanders do not want to work with the media, a holdover attitude from the Cold War and the need for secrecy. Although the security component of many HA/POs may require discretion, other components are not secret. In fact, many organizations report information through open sources, as discussed earlier. If a CJTF does not have the same attitude as most of the participants at EE 95, Washington should provide him with the appropriate media policy.

If media policy in Washington and the policy applied by the CJTF are not consistent and dependent on the situation on the ground, problems such as those just discussed can arise.

Integrating the media into the operation

The military officers at Emerald Express generally supported providing access to the media and helping them get out their stories. After all, if the military supports the media, there is a better chance that the stories will be accurate, and will reflect the good work being done by the troops on the ground. One working group chose to designate the media (at least symbolically) as "part of the TPFDD." One presenter viewed helping the media as an operational requirement. Integrating the media into an operation may require planning for their billeting; transporting satellite dishes and other equipment; and including media representatives in plans for a possible noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO).

One way to accommodate the media is through a Media City like the one set up in Somalia for United Shield. Participants also discussed whether to use media pools for HAOs, although many felt that this decision should be made separately for each operation.

The military can also assist the media by giving them schedules of CMOC meetings, providing transportation, holding regular media briefings, and giving access to footage taken by combat camera teams.

This support must be extended in a balanced way to both coalition media and DOD media.

Security considerations and the media

Some information is sensitive, therefore participants also discussed security considerations. Everyone seemed to agree that security rules left over from the Cold War should not automatically be applied to HAOs and the media today; operational security rules should be "situationally dependent." Three factors that govern when less-stringent rules apply are (1) the situation, (2) the sensitivity of the information, and (3) the reputation of the reporters. One way of increasing operational security that was suggested in relation to the media was for the military to provide as much transportation for reporters as is practical.

Transition

Three issues discussed at Emerald Express concern transition: (1) developing a transition plan, (2) developing and using measures of effectiveness, and (3) information. The following sections describe these issues.

Planning factors

To ensure that the situation in country will remain stable after the military leaves, the transition needs to go smoothly. Transition planning should take place during mission planning with the players who will be taking over from the military. In addition, the military should recognize that transition will be incremental, with the military phasing out tasks that are no longer needed, and turning over tasks to the follow-on organizations that can perform them (not necessarily in the same way, but with the same effect). Transition will take place more easily if the military plans and conducts operations so that its accomplishments can be sustained, as previously discussed.

EE 95 participants emphasized the importance of early transition planning. However, participants recognized that little guidance is available on how to carry out this transition. The logistics and medical working groups suggested a number of ways to help with transition.

The logistics working group felt that successful transition of logistics-support functions from the CJTF to civilian authorities is essential to the continued success of the humanitarian or disaster-relief operation. A number of factors need to be considered when planning for and executing the transition of logistics-support functions. First, this transition should be made part of the CJTF mission tasking, and the JTF J4 should be tasked with developing a logistics transition plan. This plan should be fully coordinated with all responsible U.S. Government and UN agencies. In addition, the exit strategy developed by the CJTF should have detailed guidelines for the logistics handoff to a transitional authority. Other factors and considerations include costs (who pays?), equipment transfers (government-furnished equipment versus contractor-furnished equipment), contractor responsibilities, restrictions on coalition or international logistics support, and contractor security.

The medical working group thought that in most HA/POs, by the time the U.S. military is called in, an established, ongoing humanitarian effort will already be in country. This effort will typically be led by the UN coordinator. The international community and NGOs/PVOs/IOs should be responsible for establishing and maintaining health policy and priorities. Any health activities undertaken by the U.S. military should be integrated into this effort to ensure that the departure of the military will not leave a vacuum that cannot be filled by local organizations and practitioners. Under these conditions, the military would not be responsible for identifying follow-on organizations.

The role of the J-5 or the future operations officer in the J-3 and the associated staffs was not discussed at EE 95. The J-5 or future operations staff are vital to the successful transition of operations to a follow-on organization or the host nation. This staff should work with the follow-on organization for incremental transition from the military. Planning for this transition should start before the operation begins.

Measures of effectiveness

The need for MOEs was discussed in a number of working groups at EE 95. The primary purpose of these MOEs was seen as tracking progress toward the end state. MOEs are quantitative variables that should be used to show trends. One simple example of a humanitarian MOE is the death rate from a particular cause, such as cholera. If this rate is plotted over a period of time and the rate shows a steady decrease, relief efforts may be making progress. If the rate does not decrease, relief efforts need to be reexamined. More information and analysis on developing and using MOEs can be found in [10].

The medical working group thought that MOEs should grow logically out of the initial assessment and the list of health-related support requests made by the UN health coordinator. At the time of the assessment, every attempt should be made to quantify conditions as much as possible. The medical working group thought that quantitative indicators on disease incidence and cause-specific mortality are the ultimate measure and should be pursued to the maximal extent. The health indicators should be at pre-crisis levels for military end state. However, the possibility that the host nation or follow-on organization could handle the health needs of the population before these health indicators are at pre-crisis levels was not discussed.

The logistics working group thought that logistics-related MOEs are likely to be among the most important factors in tracking progress toward a military end state because HA/POs are usually logistics intensive. Development of these MOEs should receive careful attention, but developing useful, meaningful MOEs is difficult. Some progress has been made in this area (not specifically during EE 95), which is discussed in [10].

Information

Regardless of how clearly the political objectives of the emergency intervention have been translated into a military mission (with a clear mission statement) and military tasks, and no matter how successful Military Information Programs have been or how good the stories the media have told about the operation, there will be some groups that will want U.S. forces to remain in the region after they have

accomplished their stated mission. Some of the working groups felt that an important part of the information campaign, therefore, is going back over the stated objectives, tasks, and MOEs, and demonstrating that they have been met, both before and after our forces redeploy.

Although the U.S. military's role in redevelopment was viewed by most EE 95 participants as very limited, the military should commit to contributing to a longer-term solution (i.e., sustainability of accomplishments and building bridges to the redevelopment phase). Operating in the local security environment and using the local infrastructure means that the military will be able to identify critical needs in infrastructure rebuilding and development, as well as in reestablishing a judicial system. MOEs can be used to identify areas for redevelopment to give to follow-on organizations or the host nation.

Redeployment

The military should address many considerations during redeployment. Emerald Express participants discussed development of an equipment phase-out plan and conclusion of the information campaign.

Develop equipment phase-out plan

Logistics-related redeployment considerations are similar to those for deployment. That is, the right people and equipment must depart at the right time. Different timetables must be accommodated. The phase-out of equipment must be planned well ahead of time, which requires extensive coordination among all the players.

Coordination is necessary to ensure availability of storage for equipment at the airports of embarkation or seaports of embarkation (APOEs/SPOEs), as well as availability of washdown facilities and MHE for loading ships and aircraft.

Reconstitution of MPF will require significant attention during redeployment. MPF maintenance-cycle schedules and other factors will determine the equipment that is backloaded on the ships. A backload

plan must be developed as early as possible (before the transition phase) to ensure equipment accountability and SPOE availability.

One of the most important and time-consuming elements of force reconstitution is equipment maintenance and preparation. This can take place either in theater before forces depart, or out of theater. Equipment maintenance can include anything from washdowns (performed in theater) to complete overhaul of equipment (usually performed out of theater). Decisions on when and where equipment maintenance is to be performed must be made before force reconstitution. The fact that the support force is likely to be the dominant portion of a force participating in many HA/POs means that equipment-maintenance requirements may differ from those following a traditional military operation.

Information campaign

If the media deployed with the force and leaves with the force, redeployment will be the final impression that they take back with them. They will remember how the local people reacted to the departure, how the sites the military occupied were left, and how the troops comported themselves. It is a good idea to do a final press briefing to recap the operation and its objectives just before departure, allowing plenty of time for questions and explanations.

Reporters will remember if the military was able to accommodate them and their equipment on the return trip. The military should plan to include the media—both unilateral and coalition media—in the pullout, or in a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO), if one is necessary. This means monitoring numbers of media representatives in the AOR throughout the operation.

Capturing lessons learned from the HA/PO is also part of the information campaign. The coordinated mission-planning working group suggested creating a combined UN and U.S. clearing house for information. This could provide a center for lessons learned. It could also provide a place where numerous “hot washes” with NGOs and others could take place. Also, one working group should be committed to write a Commander’s Handbook for an Information Strategy. Not discussed at EE 95 was the possibility that when the USIICC and the

UNIICC collect information for the transition, it would be useful to receive the lessons learned to record and share them. Perhaps they could also be incorporated in the Internet system and in an archive. The military currently uses the Joint Universal Lessons Learned (JULLs) database to convey tactical-level lessons learned. The lessons learned suggested here should include all levels.

Recommendations

We have discussed the need for the Intelligence community to become the Information community. For the short term, we recommend that the military educate the Intelligence community to tap nontraditional sources and types of information. Having this information will affect the forces, supplies, equipment, and conduct of operations for an HA/PO. For the long term, we recommend that the implications of forming HAIFC-like and USIICC-like organizations be analyzed and addressed. These types of organizations could help not only help the military, but also the policy-makers and the relief community.

Emerald Express brought out the need for coordination at all levels between civilians and the military both before and during HA/POs. We recommend that the military incorporate willing representatives from the relief community into their Operational Planning Team. We also recommend that similar coordination occur at the policy level, both in the United States and in the host nation. In addition, the OPT should communicate its operational needs to the policy-makers and vice versa.

Also, during operations coordination is needed at all levels. At the operational level, we recommend that the CMOC be formed to address civil-military operations and information exchange. We recommend that policy-level coordination groups be formed to address policy questions that are brought to the CMOC. In addition, to alleviate some of the coordination burden placed on the CMOC, we recommend that civil-military subcommittees be formed, with representatives who have specific expertise in a subject area that concerns the military, such as logistics, health, security, and infrastructure.

Finally, the military should write doctrine to address planning for rehabilitation and sustainability of military accomplishments.

Conducting an HA/PO will be different from conducting warfighting operations if sustainability is kept in mind. Also, policy-makers should understand the long-term implications of not allowing the military to build bridges to rehabilitation through some nation building that can be sustained by the host nation or the relief community.

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